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VIRGINIA COMMENTS
BARRING A WIFE'S STATUTORY INTEREST IN
HER HUSBAND'S ESTATE
Virginia recognizes three methods by which a wife's statutory in-
terest in her husband's property may be barred or released: jointure,
antenuptial contract, and postnuptial contract. Each of these devices, if
fairly and properly employed, have the effect of preventing the opera-
tion of the Virginia statutes regulating dower and other interests aris-
ing by virtue of the marital status. In a recent case, Batleman v. Rubin,1
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered some of the trouble-
some problems inherent in the use of these devices. In this case a -hus-
band and wife attempted to settle property rights by an antenuptial
contract in which the prospective wife relinquished her statutory in-
terest in her future husband's property for a specified sum of money
to be paid upon his death.
These three methods of barring dower have at least one thing in
common, namely that they are all connected, either directly or in-
directly, with the English Statute of Uses.2 Prior to the Statute of
Uses, it was common in England to convey land to uses, and under
the common law dower did not attach to a use estate because the
husband lacked legal seisin. Prudent parents, therefore, required the
future husband to make some provision before marriage for the
protection of the prospective wife. To accomplish this purpose, the
prospective husband usually had some third party convey land to
him and his future wife "in joint-tenancy, or jointure," thus assur-
ing her of an estate in the event of his death.3 In 1536 Parliament
passed the Statute of Uses, which converted use estates into legal
estates, and had no further provision been made in the statute, the
wife would have become entitled to dower in the land the husband
formerly held to uses, in addition to the jointure estate which had
been settled upon her at marriage. To prevent such double portion,
the drafters provided that wives upon whom a jointure estate had been
settled would be barred thereby from claiming dower in their hus-
bands' real estate.4 The statute then proceeded to prescribe the
standards to which the jointure must conform in order to bar the
1199 Va. 156, 98 S.E.2d 519 (1957).
2Statute of Uses, 1536, 27 Hen. 8, c. lO.
32 Blackstone, Commentaries *137.
'Statute of Uses, 1536, 27 Hen. 8, c. 1o, § 1.
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wife's dower.5 If these standards were met, the wife was prevented
by operation of the statute from claiming dower. This was termed legal
jointure.6 Although the law courts construed the requirements for
legal jointure strictly, equity was more lenient and, as a result, de-
veloped the doctrine of equitable jointure. Thus equity would en-
force a settlement made by a husband upon his wife where such set-
tlement was intended to be in lieu of dower and was assented to by the
wife prior to the marriage, although such settlement did not conform
to the strict standards for legal jointure.
7
Today, jointure in Virginia is covered by statute and is a curious
admixture of legal and equitable jointure. Code section 64-31 sets forth
the requirements that must be met in order for jointure to operate as
an absolute bar to dower.8 The following section describes the con-
ditions under which such a conveyance or devise will operate only
to put the widow to an election between jointure and dower.9 These
statutes establish the following prerequisites for jointure without
a right of election:
i. Jointure must be created by conveyance or devise. 10
rAs the statute was construed by the courts of law in England, there were five
requisites for legal jointure: (i) The conveyance had to be before marriage. (2) The
provision had to consist of an estate in land for the life of the wife, at least. (3)
It had to take effect in possession and profit immediately upon the death of the
husband. (4) The estate had to be limited to the wife herself (or to the husband
and wife jointly) and not to another in trust for her. (5) The provision had to be
in satisfaction of the wife's whole dower and had to so appear in the deed. i Ameri-
can Law of Property § 5.39 (Casner ed. 1952).
01 American Law of Property § 5.39 (Casner ed. 1952).
73 Vernier, American Family Laws § 196 (1935).
Wa. Code Ann. § 64-31 (1950).
"Va. Code Ann. § 64-32 (1950).
'OVirginia allows jointure to be created by devise. At common law jointure
could not be created by a will, but only by a conveyance. 1 American Law of
Property § 541 (Casner ed. 1952). In Shackleford v. Shackleford, 181 Va. 869, 27
S.E.2d 354 (1943), the husband bequeathed $io,ooo to a woman whom he subse-
quently married; it was not proven that she was his intended wife at the time he
made the will. The question was whether such a provision would bar dower. At the
time of this decision there was a statute providing for revocation of wills by sub-
sequent marriage. Va. Code Ann. § 5232 (1942). The court said that a bequest to
a woman whom the testator had no intention of marrying at the time the will
was made did not bar her dower in his land, because it was not proven that
the woman was an intended wife. Furthermore, the will was revoked by the sub-
sequent marriage. The court expressly left open the question whether a prospec-
tive husband could provide for the jointure of the wife, where such was the ex-
press understanding and intention, by a devise made to an intended wife in a will
executed before the marriage, which instrument would be revoked as a will by the
marriage. The question has apparently become moot because of the repeal of
the statute under which a will is revoked by a subsequent marriage. Acts of the
Assembly 1956, c. 65, repealing Va. Code Ann. § 64-58 (195o).
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2. It may be of either real or personal property."
3. It must take effect immediately upon the death of the hus-
band and continue for the life of the wife at least.
12
4- It must be before marriage and with the wife's legal as-
sent in writing.'3
5. Every such conveyance or devise will be deemed to be in
lieu of dower unless a contrary intent clearly appears in
the instrument, or in some later writing signed by the
party making the provision. 4
Unlike jointure, the antenuptial contract does not rest upon a
statutory basis, but rather is rooted in the contractual doctrine of
equitable jointure.'5 As early as 1791 the Virginia court recognized the
antenuptial contract as a means of settling property rights between
spouses.' 6 The cases would seem to be in agreement that a husband
may by an antenuptial contract bar his wife's statutory interest in his
estate.' 7 However, since the Virginia courts have had but few oppor-
tunities to consider such contracts, there is no comprehensive set of
principles in Virginia regulating them.
Batleman v. Rubin presents the first opportunity that a Virginia
court has had to consider the essential elements of a valid antenuptial
contract.18 In this case the husband induced his prospective wife to
execute a contract in which she, in consideration of $2o,ooo to be paid
upon his death, relinquished her statutory interest in his estate. The
court found that this contractual provision was roughly only one-
third as valuable as her statutory interest in the property of the hus-
"At common law jointure could only be created by a conveyance of real prop-
erty. i American Law of Property §§ 5-38 and 5.41 (Casner ed. 1952). It is not
entirely clear under Virginia law whether a bequest of personal property can con-
stitute jointure. The statute refers to "devises" and not to bequests. Shackleford v.
Shackleford, 181 Va. 869, 27 S.E.2d 354 (1943), involved a bequest, but the court
did not discuss whether a bequest of personal property could constitute jointure.
"Fuller v. Virginia Trust Co., 183 Va. 704, 33 S.E.2d 201 (1945), overruling
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 169 Va. 752, 194 S.E. 709 (1938), which had held that
a conveyance to a wife to take effect in praesenti could bar dower.
1If the conveyance or devise were made before marriage without the wife's
assent in writing or after marriage, or during the infancy of the female, the widow
is only put to an election between jointure and dower. Va. Code Ann. § 64-32 (1950).
"Va. Code Ann. § 64-31 (1950).
"2 Tiffany, Real Property § 527 (3d ed. 1939).
"0Roane's Ex'rs v. Hem, i Va. (i Wash.) *47 (1791).
:"Findley's Ex'rs v. Findley, 52 Va. (ii Gratt.) *434 (1854); Suhor v. Gooch, 244
Fed. 361 (4 th Cir. 1917).
"8"We have been cited to no case in this jurisdiction, and we have found none,
setting forth the essential elements of a valid antenuptial contract." 199 Va. 156,
158, 98 S.E.2d 519, 521 (1957).
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band as of the time of the marriage.' 9 The widow, learning of this
disparity, contended that the contract was invalid due to fraud. The
court, after examining applicable rules from other jurisdictions, adopt-
ed the following standards of conduct for parties executing antenuptial
contracts:
i. Parties engaged to be married occupy a confidential re-
lationship. Therefore, in the execution of antenuptial con-
tracts they are under a high duty to make full and fair
disclosure of their financial worth.
2. An antenuptial contract must make a fair and reasonable
provision for the wife or, in the absence thereof, there
must be a full disclosure of her husband's financial worth
and she must assent voluntarily after receiving competent,
independent advice.
3. If the provision for the wife is not fair and reasonable, a
presumption arises that the husband failed to make a full
disclosure, and the burden is placed upon those seeking
to uphold the validity of the contract to rebut the pre-
sumption with affirmative proof.
2 0
Having adopted these principles, the court found that the pro-
vision for the wife in the contract was so disproportionate to the
statutory interest released as to raise the presumption of nondisclosure
on the part of the husband. Since, in the instant case, the heirs of the
husband could not sustain the burden of rebutting the presumption,
the court held the contract to be invalid.
2 1
At common law, a postnuptial contract could not be employed
to settle property rights between husband and wife because of the
"See Suhor v. Gooch, 244 Fed. 361 (4th Cir. 1917), which holds that in determin-
ing the fairness of the contract, the court does not look to the financial worth of
the parties at the time of death, but at the time of the execution of the contract.
It is submitted that to sustain the validity of such a contract, one would need
only to prove that the provision for the wife was fair and reasonable, or that
the wife signed the contract voluntarily, with full knowledge of her husband's
worth and on independent competent advice. But it is not necessary that both con-
ditions be satisfied.
2 1The avowed purpose of the husband in executing the contract in the instant
case was to bar his wife's dower so as to allow him to freely convey land without hav-
ing her join in the deed. The contract being invalid, the court indicated that the wife
could either take under the husband's will, or take her statutory share. If she should
elect to take her statutory interest, she would be entitled to dower in all "the land
the husband owned during coverture. Such an election apparently unsettles titles
to all the lands the husband has conveyed in his name alone. Until the legislature or
the courts formulate a more certain set of principles governing antenuptial contracts,
the validity of each such contract will be doubtful. Therefore, it is advisable that
the husband always have his wife join in deeds conveying land in which she might
be entitled to dower, irrespective of any antenuptial contract purporting to bar
her dower.
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incapacity of spouses to contract inter se.2 2 "Today, however, because
of legislation making a married woman sui juris as to her property, a
wife may execute a binding contract nearly everywhere in the United
States to release her dower or similar interest, provided the contract
is fair and supported by adequate consideration. '23 Like the ante-
nuptial contract, the postnuptial contract has its origin in the
Statute of Uses, which provided that if a settlement was made upon
the wife during marriage which otherwise met the requirements for
legal jointure, the wife, upon the husband's death, would be put to an
election between the settlement and dower.24 Courts of equity, carry-
ing this a step further, put the wife to an election even though the
settlement did not constitute legal jointure. Thus, even where the
wife was not absolutely barred from dower by the settlement, she
was, at least, put to an election and not allowed to have both.2 5
In order to make a final settlement of property rights between hus-
band and wife by means of a postnuptial contract, it is necessary
that the wife relinquish her contingent right of dower to the hus-
band. It is doubtful, however, whether a wife can do this in Virginia.
A line of authority, beginning in 1855, holds that the wife may release
her contingent right of dower.2G This early authority was reaffirmed
in 1926 in Eschner v. Eschner,2 7 where the court stated: "It is well
settled in Virginia that the relinquishment by the wife of her inchoate
right of dower in the husband's real estate constitutes a valuable con-
sideration for a postnuptial settlement in favor of the wife."28
However, these cases are not clear as to whether the wife may re-
linquish her contingent right of dower directly to the husband so as to
allow him to convey land without the necessity of her joining in the
deed. Powell v. Tilson2 9 indicates that she cannot. In that case the
court was construing a postnuptial contract in which the husband
released his right of curtesy in the wife's estate in consideration of
the wife's release of dower in his estate. Although the case was not
decided on this point, the court stated that such a contract would be
invalid for want of consideration on the wife's part since she could
2x American Law of Property § 5.40 (Casner ed. 1952).
23Id. at 723.
"Statute of Uses, 1536, 27 Hen. 8, c. io, § 9.
Zi American Law of Property § 5-40 (Casner ed. 1952).
6William and Mary College v. Powell, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) *37, (1855); De Farges
v. Ryland and Brooks, 87 Va. 404, 12 S.E. 8o5 (1891); Ficklin's Adm'r v. Rixey, 89
Va. 832, 17 S.E. 325 (1893).
7 146 Va. 417, 131 S.E. 8oo (1926).
2Eschner v. Eschner, 146 Va. 417, 423, 131 S.E. 8oo, 802 (1926).
D161 Va. 318, 170 S.E. 750 (1933).
CASE COMMENTS
not release her contingent right of dower to her husband. In constru-
ing the applicable Code section,3 0 the court relied upon Burks' Address
on the Code of 1919:31 "The extent of the power of a married woman
over her contingent right of dower is somewhat doubtful under the
law now in force. The revision seeks to remove all doubt on this sub-
ject, and makes it clear that the wife cannot convey her contingent
right of dower to any person whomsoever (which of course includes the
husband) while the husband owns the real estate in question."
32
Upon close observation it becomes apparent that there is in Vir-
ginia no really satisfactory method of settling property rights between
spouses. Jointure may be utilized if one conforms strictly to the statute,
but it cannot be used to bar the wife's share in her husband's personal
property.33 The antenuptial contract is available, but the law in that
field is so unsettled that it is difficult to draw with certainty a valid con-
tract. Virginia has recognized the postnuptial contract, but the effec-
tiveness of such a contract is doubtful because the wife is apparently
precluded by statute from releasing her dower to the husband while he
still owns the land. There is no good reason why the husband and
wife should not have complete freedom to contract between them-
selves in reference to the rights of each in the property of the other,
either before marriage or after marriage. 34 The General Assembly
might well consider enacting legislation toward this end.
S. JANiEs THoMPSON, JR.
wVa. Code Ann. § 5135 (igig), carried over into the 1950 Code as § 55-4o.
315 Va- L. Reg. (N-s.) 97 (1919).
'id. at log. According to the statute, Va. Code Ann. § 55-40 (195o), there are
two ways by which the wife may relinquish her dower: (i) join in a deed with
the husband, or (2) after the husband has disposed of his interest in the land
she may release her dower by a separate deed or contract.
Although the wife cannot release to her husband her contingent right of dower
in land that he has not previously disposed of, there would seem to be no ob-
jection to a contract in which the wife agrees with the husband to release to some
third person (to whom the husband has conveyed or intends to convey the land
in question) her contingent right of dower in his land. Burwell's Ex'r v. Lumsden, 65
Va. (24 Gratt.) *443 (1874).
nFindley's Ex'rs v. Findley, 52 Va. (ii Gratt.) *434 (1854).
13 Vernier, American Family Laws § 198 (1935).
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